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Exam 17: Oligopoly

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Question 251

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Consider a market served by a monopolist, Firm A. A new firm, Firm B, enters the market and, as a result, Firm A lowers its price to try to drive Firm B out of the market. This practice is known as

A) resale price maintenance.
B) predatory tying.
C) tying.
D) predatory pricing.

E) A) and B)
F) C) and D)

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Question 252

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Cooperation is easier to achieve in __________.

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Question 253

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Which of the following statements is (are) true of the prisoners' dilemma? (i) Rational self-interest leads neither party to confess. (ii) Cooperation between the prisoners is difficult to maintain. (iii) Cooperation between the prisoners is individually rational.

Scenario 17-2. ​ Imagine that two oil companies, BQ and Exxoff, own adjacent oil fields. Under the fields is a common pool of oil worth $144 million. Drilling a well to recover oil costs $5 million per well. If each company drills one well, each will get half of the oil and earn a $67 million profit ($72 million in revenue - $5 million in costs) . Assume that having X percent of the total wells means that a company will collect X percent of the total revenue. -Refer to Scenario 17-2. Exxoff's dominant strategy would lead to what sort of well-drilling behavior?

Table 17-33 Suppose that Robert and Howard own the only two movie studios in California. Each producer must choose between a low budget and a high budget strategy for his next film. The economic profit from each strategy is indicated in the table below: Howard Low budget High budget -Refer to Table 17-33. Does Howard have a dominant strategy? If so, describe it.

Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. -Refer to Table 17-13. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, Lopes's annual profit will grow by

Table 17-30 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: -Refer to Table 17-30. Briefly explain why each duopolist earns a lower profit at the Nash equilibrium than if they cooperated to produce the monopoly output.

Lori and Maya are competitors in a local market. Each is trying to decide if it is better to advertise on TV, on radio, or not at all. If they both advertise on TV, each will earn a profit of $10,000. If they both advertise on radio, each will earn a profit of $14,000. If neither advertises at all, each will earn a profit of $20,000. If one advertises on TV and other advertises on radio, then the one advertising on TV will earn $16,000 and the other will earn $6,000. If one advertises on TV and the other does not advertise, then the one advertising on TV will earn $30,000 and the other will earn $4,000. If one advertises on radio and the other does not advertise, then the one advertising on radio will earn $24,000 and the other will earn $8,000. If both follow their dominant strategy, then Lori will

Table 17-12 The table shows the town of Driveaway's demand schedule for gasoline. Assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incurs a cost of $2 for each gallon sold, with no fixed cost. -Refer to Table 17-12. If there are exactly five sellers of gasoline in Driveaway and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely?

Assume that demand for a product that is produced at zero marginal cost is reflected in the table below. a.What is the profit-maximizing level of production for a group of oligopolistic firms that operate as a cartel? b.Assume that this market is characterized by a duopoly in which collusive agreements are illegal. What market price and quantity will be associated with a Nash equilibrium?

Scenario 17-5 Assume that a local restaurant sells two items, salads and steaks. The restaurant's only two customers on a particular day are Mr. Carnivore and Ms. Leafygreens. Mr. Carnivore is willing to pay $20 for a steak and $7 for a salad. Ms. Leafygreens is willing to pay only $8 for a steak, but is willing to pay $12 for a salad. Assume that the restaurant can provide each of these items at zero marginal cost. -Refer to Scenario 17-5. If the restaurant is unable to use tying, what is the profit-maximizing price to charge for a salad?

Table 17-29 Suppose that two firms, Wild Willy's Wonderdrink (Firm W) and Hyper Hank's Hydration (Firm H) , comprise the market for energy drinks. Each firm determines that it could lower its costs and increase its profits if both firms reduced their advertising budgets. But for the plan to work, each firm must agree to refrain from advertising. Each firm believes that advertising works by increasing the demand for the firm's energy drinks, but each firm also believes that if neither firm advertises, the cost savings will outweigh the lost sales. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Firm W Breaks agreement Maintains agreement and advertises and does not advertise -Refer to Table 17-29 Does either Firm W or Firm H have a dominant strategy?

Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: -Refer to Table 17-1. If Rochelle and Alec operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how many gallons of water will be produced and sold?

To move the allocation of resources closer to the social optimum, policymakers should typically try to induce firms in an oligopoly to

If duopolists individually pursue their own self-interest when deciding how much to produce, the profit-maximizing price they will charge for their product will be

Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. -Refer to Table 17-13. Increasing the size of its store and parking lot is a dominant strategy for

Table 17-26 Two prescription drug manufacturers (Firm A and Firm B) are faced with lawsuits from states to recover the healthcare related expenses associated with side-effects from its drugs. Each drug manufacturer has evidence that indicates that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. State prosecutors do not have access to the same data used by drug manufacturers and thus will have difficulty recovering full costs without the help of at least one of the drug manufacturer's studies. Each firm has been presented with an opportunity to lower its liability in the suit if it cooperates with attorneys representing the states. -Refer to Table 17-26. If both firms follow a dominant strategy, Firm B's profits (losses) will be

A manufacturer of light bulbs sells its products to retail stores and requires the stores to sell the bulbs to customers for $2 per bulb. This practice is known as tying.

Scenario 17-3. ​ Consider two countries, Kinglandia and Rovinastan, that are engaged in an arms race. Each country must decide whether to build new weapons or to disarm existing weapons. Each country prefers to have more arms than the other because a large arsenal gives it more influence in world affairs. But each country also prefers to live in a world safe from the other country's weapons. The following table shows the possible outcomes for each decision combination. The numbers in each cell represent the country's ranking of the outcome (10 = best outcome, 1 = worst outcome) . -Refer to Scenario 17-3. If Rovinastan chooses to disarm its existing weapons, then Kinglandia will

In imperfectly competitive markets, increasing production will decrease the price of all units sold. This concept is known as the